Spanish multinationals already established, a recently signed agreement with the German government, US investors testing the market, and local groups with concessions of hundreds of megawatts.
The map of actors that can boost renewable generation in Ecuador is beginning to fill up, just as the country needs to close a gap that, according to some private sector sources, would be even larger than the official target of 1250 MW , which would be a floor rather than a ceiling.
From his dual role as a trade association executive and investment developer based in Germany, Marco Ledesma , director of International Relations at CANE3 , calculated that the real gap is around 2000 MW, above the generation deficit that the Executive itself estimates at around 1000 MW.
He nevertheless admitted that the sector "must operate with official values", although insisting that the actual need is greater.
"The official goals set are achievable as long as there is investment. Today we have the lowest country risk in the last 12 years (around 400 points), which favors the interest of companies in making investments," he summarized in a dialogue with Energía Estratégica .
Their diagnosis is: the legal framework is open and regulated prices are among the highest in the region, but without capital the goal remains just an intention.
Among the multinationals already present, the specialist pointed to the Spanish companies Grupo Cobra and Acciona, while clarifying that "the German government has just signed an agreement to inject more than USD 81 million into renewables in Ecuador.
“They come in with loans, with associated technology transfer,” he explained regarding the model. And he places the European Union's Global Gateway mechanism within that same European financing framework, which has already announced 24 strategic projects and works related to transmission, interconnection, and generation , with a total estimated investment need of €6.84 billion.
"There are also investors from the United States looking for projects because Ecuador has very good relations with the American government," he said, adding that the US administration itself had put companies "on the table" for these developments.
Meanwhile, on the local front, economic groups with financial backing have already taken a position through concessions, so the specialist acknowledged that Grupo Futuro "was assigned 150 MW", while the group linked to the Supermaxi chain "also has a concession of 100 MW", although the projects are not yet in operation.
Why didn't the money arrive sooner?
The trust, which begins in November, addresses a specific problem that Ledesma describes bluntly. Until now, revenue collection went through the central government first, which weakened the payment guarantee for the private sector, but, as he understands it, the resistance wasn't just bureaucratic.
"Those who have the money are the distribution companies, because they supply the energy and are in charge of collecting payment. These distribution companies have their unions, and these unions have not allowed these trusts to be implemented at the time," he explained.
The cost of that obstacle was tangible: "The 500 MW projects, which are about 3 or 4 years old, were not executed at the time. Even the IDB gave a solidarity guarantee loan to put it as security for the private company."
With the trust, the flow is reorganized: "All the resources that come in there will be directed directly to the payments," before going to the tax authorities; so for Ledesma, it is the missing piece to unlock investor confidence.
How to enter the market: contracts and mandatory self-generation
For capital considering investing, Ecuador currently offers five contract models - distributed generation, self-supply (SGDA), self-generation, autonomous districts and concession contracts - each with a governing body and a different risk profile.
The draw is the prices: solar photovoltaic energy is remunerated at "8 cents per kWh" and hydroelectric energy "between 5 and 6 cents per kWh", levels which, according to Ledesma, "have no regional comparison"
In addition to the regulated supply, there is a demand driver created by ministerial agreement: large consumers - including the expanding mining industry - must become self-generators.
"They have a deadline to achieve that. And a mining plant can easily consume 300 MW in its primary stage." The prime example is the Supermaxi chain, which supplies its operations through self-generation.
The picture that Ledesma paints is that of a market with the legal door open, the highest prices in the region and a growing captive demand, but conditioned by two variables that cannot be resolved with regulations: the capital that actually dares to enter and a system that needs to diversify and store up in order not to be at the mercy of the next drought.