The new edition of the streaming series “It had to be said and it was said” , the audiovisual cycle of Strategic Energy , featured Arturo Herrero , one of the Spanish executives with the most international experience in the solar business.
In a conversation with Gastón Fenés , Herrero reviewed some of the stories that marked his career: his beginnings at BP Solar, Merrill Lynch's offer to join the internationalization of Trina Solar, the subsequent leap to Jinko Solar with Credit Suisse, his time in the world of trackers with GameChange, Nextracker and ARRAY, and his current work at AlterPower in consulting also for BESS.
The conversation allowed us to reconstruct a key part of the recent history of the global photovoltaic industry: the moment when still small Chinese manufacturers began to transform themselves into international companies, gain scale, go public and challenge the leadership of European, Japanese and American companies.
Where does your connection with Trina Solar begin?
It started when I was at BP Solar. At that time, I was global purchasing director and my job was to travel, visit suppliers, and close major contracts for silicon, wafers, cells, and solar panels.
Trina Solar was one of my suppliers. I traveled a lot in Asia: Malaysia, Indonesia, Japan, and especially China. We're talking about the years 2004, 2005, and 2006. The Chinese photovoltaic industry was starting to grow, but it still had many quality problems and a reputation heavily influenced by price competition.
When I conducted audits at the Trina factory, I had a positive impression of it. It was a small company, but it had a very clear vision for growth. Furthermore, I had a good relationship with its founder and CEO, Gao Jifan, and his wife, Grace Wu, the only member of the management team who spoke English.
How does Merrill Lynch appear in that story?
It was completely unexpected. They sent me two plane tickets, one for me and one for my partner at the time, to go to Paris. I didn't really know what it was about. The invitation didn't come directly from Trina Solar, but from Merrill Lynch.
They picked me up at the hotel and took me to a very nice restaurant. Two executives dressed in dark suits, white shirts, and black ties were waiting for me there.
We started talking about BP Solar, purchasing, suppliers, and how we managed procurement internationally. Then they started asking me about Trina Solar.
I told them I was a major, vertically integrated supplier, but still very small. I explained that we were certifying wafers, that the qualification processes were lengthy, and that I saw an interesting growth potential.
Then they told me they were considering investing $40 million in Trina Solar and taking it to Wall Street.
Did you understand at that moment that the offer was for you?
No. I thought they were asking me for references or names of professionals who could help them.
I told them I could suggest people from the sector, professionals from BP Solar or the international photovoltaic industry. I thought they wanted to select candidates.
But over dessert they told me something like, “I don’t think you’ve understood the conversation. What we want is for you to become part of this project.”
The idea was for me to help internationalize Trina Solar, a company that at that time was basically local, Chinese, with very few customers outside the country, and prepare it to go public in New York.
What were they looking for in your profile?
I think they saw several things. First, that I knew the photovoltaic sector very well from my time at BP Solar. Second, that I had international experience. Third, that I was European at a time when the growth of the solar market was primarily coming from Europe.
At that time, feed-in tariffs were being approved in Germany. Spain and Italy would follow later. The United States was not yet the market it would become.
Furthermore, I was very familiar with the factory, the production processes, the solar panel engineering, and the supply chain. From my position in purchasing, I had to thoroughly understand the quality, the suppliers, and the reliability of the products.
The proposal was to assume the global commercial vice presidency of Trina Solar.
Was it a difficult decision to leave BP Solar to join a Chinese company?
It was a very difficult decision. In fact, at first I said no.
I was very happy at BP Solar. I had my house in Tres Cantos, a company car, benefits, business class trips, training courses, and a very solid corporate structure. BP Solar was a learning experience.
Going to a Chinese company in 2006 was taking a huge risk. Trina Solar wasn't what it is today. At that time, Chinese companies had a reputation for poor quality, unpredictable contracts, and competing almost exclusively on price.
My colleagues and my family told me I was a little crazy for going to China.
What made you change your mind?
I was invited to visit the factory. More plane tickets arrived, and I went to Changzhou, in Jiangsu province. It wasn't Shanghai or Beijing. In 2006, Changzhou was practically in the middle of nowhere.
But when I saw the factory, the vision for growth, the support they were willing to give, and the opportunity to build something global, I decided to take the risk.
Sometimes in life you have to make decisions that create a before and after. For me, that was one of them.
What was the process of internationalizing Trina Solar like?
At that time, Chinese companies invested heavily in international know-how. They gave us a lot of responsibility.
I had a driver, a paid apartment, and a lot of support, but we also worked a lot: from Monday to Saturday and sometimes even on Sundays.
At Trina Solar, I was the foreigner who participated in the quarterly reports and earnings calls with investors. It was just the CEO, the CFO, and me. For a company that was globalizing, it was a huge responsibility.
The key was not to compete solely on price. There were hundreds of solar panel manufacturers in China, and differentiation was practically nonexistent. We focused on differentiating ourselves through our brand, service, sales structure, and management team.
What role did the local teams play?
It was fundamental. I didn't believe in simply sending Chinese executives to sell to Germany, the United States, Mexico, or Colombia. Each market needed local professionals with knowledge of the culture, the customer, and the way business is done.
We recruited local teams in different countries, and that helped build trust. The brand couldn't just be a Chinese company selling cheap goods. It had to be a global company, with international management, service, and a real presence in the markets.
That work helped Trina Solar become the number one manufacturer of solar panels internationally in 2010.
Then Jinko Solar appeared. How did that second stock market story unfold?
After Merrill Lynch with Trina Solar, Credit Suisse appeared with a similar proposal. They wanted to repeat the process: take another Chinese company, internationalize it, and take it public.
They asked me if I was interested. The terms were even more interesting. And they told me, “The company is called Jinko Solar.”
I had no idea who Jinko was. At that time, they were number 13 or 14 among manufacturers, mainly focused on China.
That was in 2010. Between 2010 and 2016, we made Jinko Solar the global number one. Trina Solar came in at number two.
What do you remember about Jinko Solar's IPO?
Jinko Solar's initial public offering on Wall Street is one of the experiences I remember most fondly.
We were in New York with the founding team, the CFO, and the top executives. We did the investor roadshow. We flew by private jet from New York to San Francisco to arrive early and start the meetings.
It was a very intense personal and professional experience. But beyond the financial aspect, these processes allow companies to grow in value, gain scale, increase production, and expand internationally. They also lend credibility and confidence to the market.
An initial public offering (IPO) is not just about ringing the bell or having a symbolic moment. It's a tool for financing growth, gaining global visibility, and consolidating a company.
What was the most important thing for Jinko to take that leap?
Once again, it was the team. For me, success lay in management, motivation, and the ability to lead a team of highly skilled people with the right attitude. At Jinko Solar, we built a very strong team with professionals like Alberto Cuter, Gulnar Abdulina, Teresa Alfaro, Daniel Peña, and Nigel Cokroft, among others.
Alberto was key. I initially hired him to handle the Italian market, and then we promoted him to also handle Latin America.
I believe that in Spain we have an interesting capacity to manage teams: we can be tough and demanding, but also recognize merit, motivate and support.
What did those IPOs mean to you?
These were very important milestones. But not only because of the financial aspect.
Obviously, an IPO can increase a company's value, raise capital, and accelerate its expansion. But for me, it was also very important to see how small teams, with limited marketing and sales resources at the beginning, could build global companies through conviction, hard work, and sound strategy.
At Trina and Jinko, we had a clear vision: to do the job well, build trust, and compete on more than just price. We based our rewards not only on financial gain but, above all, on the satisfaction of a job well done.
You also mentioned Dan Shugar. Where does he rank in your career?
Dan Shugar, from Nextracker, was the one who invited me to join the company, and he is one of the people I admire most in the industry.
Especially at the beginning, Dan would call me every two weeks to ask what he needed, what resources were needed to boost Nextracker's expansion in Europe, Latin America and other international markets.
That's what sets him apart as a leader. He has a very clear vision, excellent communication skills, and tremendous work ethic. Furthermore, he doesn't need to work for money, yet he remains dedicated. For me, he's a natural leader and a key role model.
Why do you consider him a different kind of executive?
Because he combined vision, hard work, and a close connection to the operations. He wasn't a distant leader. He was attentive to resources, teams, and how to grow the company.
He has transformed Nextracker into a much larger company, not limited solely to the traditional solar tracker business. For me, his ability to build an organization, communicate a vision, and sustain a demanding work agenda makes him an invaluable role model within the industry.
Besides Trina, Jinko, and Nextracker, you mentioned many professionals who influenced you. How important were those connections?
Very much so. I still keep in touch with former colleagues at BP Solar. We meet annually, and I have very fond memories of people like Ben Hill, Stuart Branigan, Rene Müller, Javier Rodriguez, Paco Conesa, Emilio Mera, Emilio Camblor, and others.
Throughout my career I also worked with professionals who were very important at different stages: Álvaro García Maltras, Dana Albella, Alberto Cuter, Teresa Alfaro, Sandra Valverde, Javier Rico and Carlos Alarguedas, among many others.
For me, that's one of the things that fills me with the most joy: having had the pleasure of working with very professional, very good people who, in many cases, remain great friends.
Looking at the current state of the solar market, what is your assessment of Chinese brands?
There has been enormous evolution, but also a cannibalization of the very growth of Chinese companies.
Many companies lost their differentiation in brand, service, and customer care. They focused on competing on price to the point where they could no longer sustain that race of low margins and recurring losses.
I think they were victims of their own success.
At Trina and Jinko, we tried to defend our margins with brand, service, quality, and trust. But today, many other companies only know how to compete almost exclusively on price.
Is that risk also being seen in batteries?
Yes. Unfortunately, I see the same thing happening with batteries.
When many Chinese companies want to gain market share, they do so purely on price. Instead of defending margins with quality, service, customer care, and differentiation, they enter a price war spiral.
That might work in the short term, but it destroys value. And if battery energy storage (BES) follows the same path as solar modules, the market could enter a very complicated dynamic.
Are there any Chinese companies that have managed to build brand value?
Yes. I think Jinko Solar, Trina Solar, Canadian Solar, JA Solar, Longi, and certainly Aiko have a mindset more oriented towards brand value, marketing, and more attentive customer service.
But many other companies are managed with a more short-term logic: to meet objectives: to gain market share by lowering prices.
Solar modules have become highly commoditized. It's harder to differentiate them than a tracker, for example. A solar tracker has more room to differentiate itself through technology, software, service, engineering, and performance. It's custom-made specifically for each project.
Why can't the market be regulated when there is oversupply?
I recall an anecdote from 2008. In the midst of the crisis, several large Chinese solar companies met. The idea was to try to set a minimum price because it didn't make sense to keep destroying profit margins.
But the agreement lasted two days.
The following week it was Intersolar in Munich and one of the companies came out with an aggressive offer below the agreed prices.
Those kinds of deals would be unthinkable in the United States and Europe, but they were attempted in China. The problem is that there's always someone willing to lower the price even further to gain market share and attract customers.
How do you see industrial protection in the United States and Europe?
The United States has come to highly value local production. The Inflation Reduction Act incentivizes producers who meet certain percentages of local content. This has spurred productive investment within the American market and helped protect local industry from the massive influx of Asian products.
I believe that strategy can be sustainable because it doesn't depend solely on Republicans or Democrats. The protection of the American market has been in place for over ten years, also under the Biden and Obama administrations.
Europe, on the other hand, arrived late. For years it focused on globalization and opening borders, but when competition is so aggressive and cost differences are so large, it becomes very difficult to sustain local industry.
European solar panel manufacturing has practically disappeared. Today, there is still capacity in inverters and trackers, but very little in modules. Putting up barriers now, when the industry no longer exists, makes very little sense.
What opportunities do you see ahead?
Despite the challenging times, I am optimistic. There is immense demand ahead.
The growth of data centers, artificial intelligence, cryptocurrencies, blockchain, electric vehicles, and the general electrification of the economy will require a great deal of energy.
Renewable energy sources are cheaper, more competitive, and faster to implement than many conventional technologies. And I see particular opportunities in hybrid solar photovoltaic projects with energy storage.
The PV + storage combination is going to be very successful.
What role does AlterPower play in this stage?
I founded AlterPower in Switzerland about 13 years ago. The idea was to leverage all the experience accumulated over more than two decades in the photovoltaic industry.
AlterPower works on strategy, international expansion, customer analysis, project development, and technical-financial evaluation of those projects.
We have collaborated with companies such as Power Electronics, Fimer, Fox ESS, Sermatec and other companies linked to solar, storage, inverters and electric mobility.
My advantage is being able to combine technical expertise —panels, trackers, inverters, batteries— with a financial and commercial perspective.
How do you define yourself professionally?
I define myself as a results-oriented corporate executive, helping companies in their international expansion thanks to my commercial, technical and financial management skills.
For me, it is essential to understand how a technology generates a return on investment, how a project is structured, and how an organization is built that is capable of growing and creating sustainable value in different markets.
In trackers, for example, it is key to understand how the combined hardware and software allow for increased energy production, improved yield, and making financial models credible and sustainable over 20 or 25 years.
What project would you like to develop now?
I am working on a project related to energy efficiency in industrialized modular homes.
The idea is to manufacture homes in a single plant, using automated processes, reducing execution times and costs, and increasing energy efficiency through better materials.
Spain and Europe have a huge housing shortage. I believe industrialized modular construction could be an interesting solution. Furthermore, we want to integrate batteries, electric vehicle chargers, and solar panels.
It's a project we're starting with partners who are experts in robotics, industrialization, and modular architecture. We're raising capital, and I think it could be very interesting.
The interview with Arturo Herrero on “ It had to be said and it was said” provided a privileged look at one of the most important processes in the modern solar industry: the transformation of relatively small Chinese manufacturers into global companies capable of listing on Wall Street and leading the world market.
From that dinner in Paris with Merrill Lynch, where they talked about investing $40 million in Trina Solar and taking it to New York, to Jinko Solar's roadshow with investors, passing through Nextracker's international expansion and Dan Shugar's leadership, Herrero reconstructs a stage in which the renewable industry changed in scale, geography and competitive logic.
His warning, however, looks to the present: the price war that hit the solar module business could be repeated in batteries if companies fail to differentiate themselves beyond cost.
And their vision for the future is optimistic: data centers, electrification, storage, and hybrid projects can usher in a new cycle of growth. To compete in this scenario, simply manufacturing cheaply will no longer be enough. Branding, service, technology, talent, and a global strategy will be essential.